
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Federal Aviation

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Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of The Civil Aviation Security Program

January 1-June 30, 1985




Washington, D.C. 20591

Navember 1985

Report of the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to the United States Congress pursuant to Section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958

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of Transportation

Federal Aviation Administration

Office of the Administrator

800 Independence Ave., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20591

7 1985 NOV

The Honorable George Bush President of the Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

I am forwarding the Federal Aviation Administration's Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program. It covers the period January 1 through June 30, 1985, and is submitted in accordance with section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act.

During the reporting period, there were three U.S. air carrier hijackings. During one of these, a U.S. citizen was murdered, and 39 persons were held hostage by terrorists for over 2 weeks. As a result of this incident, the President directed that the Secretary of Transportation, in cooperation with other members of the Cabinet, undertake several initiatives to thwart this type of criminal activity.

Following the guidance of the President and the Secretary of Transportation, I have instituted a large number of measures which are designed to expand and improve the civil aviation security system of the United States and to encourage significant improvement in security measures at international airports worldwide. These measures include expanded use of Federal Air Marshals, assessment of major foreign airports to assure they meet the security standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization, additional special training for airline crewmembers and security coordinators, stronger security measures for baggage and cargo, and increased research and development activity.

I believe these activities, coupled with the assessments of foreign airports and other efforts which are being taken to implement the security requirements contained in the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-83), will ensure that the U.S. commercial airline industry continues to be second to none in safety and security.

A report has also been sent to the Speaker of the House.

Sincerely,

Donald D. Engen Administrator

Enclosure



of Transportation

Federal Aviation Administration

NOV 7 1985 Office of the Administrator 800 Independence Ave., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20591

The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. Speaker of the House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

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Enclosure

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- 1. Hijacking Attempts on U.S. Scheduled Air Carrier Aircraft
- 2. Hijacking Attempts on U.S. and Foreign Aircraft
- 3. Hijacking Attempts on U.S. General Aviation Aircraft
- 4. Actual Hijackings and Prevented Hijacking Attempts
- 5. Basic Policies
- 6. Scope and Effectiveness
- 7. Airline Passenger Screening Results
- 8. Compliance and Enforcement Actions

I. EXECUTIVE HIGHLIGHTS

- 1. THIS REPORT COVERS THE PERIOD JANUARY JUNE 1985
- 2. OVER 481 MILLION PERSONS WERE PROCESSED THROUGH U.S. PASSENGER CHECKPOINTS. THERE WERE 1448 FIREARMS DETECTED WITH 599 RELATED ARRESTS.
- 3. WORLDWIDE, 16 HIJACKINGS OCCURRED (6 SUCCESSFUL) AGAINST SCHEDULED AIR CARRIERS. THREE WERE AGAINST U.S. AIRLINES (1 SUCCESSFUL).
- 4. NO U.S. GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT WERE HIJACKED DURING THE PERIOD.
- 5. ALLEGED SECURITY VIOLATIONS BY AIR CARRIERS, AIRPORTS, AND INDIVIDUALS TOTALED 1,791.
- 6. OF THE 1,791 ALLEGED SECURITY VIOLATIONS, 150 RESULTED IN CIVIL PENALTIES TOTALING \$51,795.

II. INTRODUCTION

This 22nd Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program is submitted in accordance with section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act. This report covers the period January 1 – June 30, 1985. WIt presents a concise picture of the nationwide effectiveness of the procedures used to screen passengers and their carry-on items prior to boarding scheduled and public charter flights as well as visitors desiring access to sterile air terminal passenger boarding areas.

III. AIRCRAFT HIJACKINGS

A U.S. citizen (or corporation) engaged in public charter and/or scheduled passenger air operations must hold an operating certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Technically, that person (or corporation) is a "certificate holder." In this report, such certificate holders are referred to as air carriers in order to differentiate them and their aircraft from general aviation operators and aircraft.

There were three attempted hijackings of U.S. scheduled air carriers during this period. One was successful; one was incomplete, that is, the hijacker was apprehended before reaching his destination; and one was unsuccessful.

The successful hijacking was perpetrated by two armed Lebanese Muslims against a flight departing from Athens, Greece. The hijackers' major objective was to secure the release of over 700 Shiite Muslim prisoners held by Israel. One U.S. citizen (military) was killed by the hijackers and 39 U.S. citizens were held as hostages in Lebanon for more than 2 weeks before being released. In a second incident, a Cuban refugee tried to hijack the aircraft while en route to Havana, Cuba, by threatening to incinerate and blow up the aircraft. He was apprehended after the crew convinced the hijacker that they had landed in Havana when actually the flight had landed in Orlando, Florida. He had no flammables or explosives. In the third incident, an armed female attempted to hijack an aircraft while it was on the ground at Cleveland, Ohio. She allegedly wanted to go to Brazil. She forced her way on board at gun point, wounding a passenger agent in the process and firing at another. She was captured on board by police authorities following lengthy negotiations and an exchange of gun fire during which she was wounded.

The hijacking of the U.S. air carrier aircraft from Athens, the killing of a U.S. citizen to reinforce the hijacker's demands for prisoner release, and the subsequent hostage situation resemble closely the methods employed and objectives of the hijacking of a Kuwait Airlines flight from Dubai in December 1984, during which two U.S. citizens were murdered.

There were no U.S. general aviation aircraft hijacked during this reporting period.

The three hijacking attempts against U.S. aircraft compare to 13 hijackings (5 successful) of foreign air carriers during the same period. This equals the lowest U.S. percentage (19%) of worldwide hijackings since 1973 during any comparable 6-month period.

(See Exhibits 1, 2, and 3)

Air carrier and airport security measures required by the FAA have undoubtedly prevented or deterred hijackings or other crimes against civil aviation. It is impossible, however, to determine exactly how many such incidents would have been carried out in the absence of such measures. Two admittedly imprecise measures of such criminal intent are the number of firearms detected at passenger screening points under suspicious circumstances and the number of individuals apprehended at passenger screening points while attempting to gain unauthorized access to aircraft. As noted elsewhere in this report, 1,448 firearms were detected at screening points during this reporting period as compared to 1,602 detected during the last reporting period. In addition, one individual tried to board a U.S. air carrier while armed with handguns under circumstances which indicated that he possibly intended to hijack the aircraft. This incident raises to 113 the estimated number of hijackings or related crimes against civil aviation that have been prevented since 1973 by FAA-required security measures.

(See Exhibit 4)

IV. BASIC POLICIES

The FAA cannot lay claim to sole credit for the overall success of the U.S. Civil Aviation Security Program. That success is due primarily to mutual cooperation and support among the Federal Government, airlines, airport operators, local communities, and air carrier passengers. Federal Government, in furtherance of assuring safe air travel, establishes and enforces basic regulations, policies, and procedures guiding the program and provides certain specialized direction and security services to the air industry. The Government's policies recognize air carrier responsibilities for the safety of travelers, baggage, cargo, and aircraft. Airport operators contribute a secure ground environment and provide necessary law enforcement support for airline passenger boarding and airport security measures. The passengers, who are the principal beneficiaries of the security program, pay for the security program through the security charges included in the calculation of airline ticket prices and through the inconvenience of having to submit to voluntary screening and search.

(See Exhibit 5)

V. PASSENGER SCREENING - SCOPE AND EFFECTIVENESS

Airline passenger screening procedures, which include inspection of passengers and their carry-on items, have been in effect since 1973. Since the initiation of those strengthened security measures, over 6 billion

persons have been screened and almost 8 billion carry-on items have been inspected. This screening and inspection activity has resulted in the detection of over 33,000 firearms with almost 14,000 associated arrests.

(See Exhibit 6)

These mandatory security screening procedures have been in force since January 1973. During this more than 12-year period, there has been a dramatic overall decrease, with some ups and downs, in the number of hijackings of U.S. air carrier aircraft. The ups (in 1980 - 21 hijackings, and 1983 - 18 hijackings) primarily were the result of waves of homesick Cuban refugees trying to return to Cuba. Most of them succeeded (13 in 1980, and 13 in 1983) primarily by threatening to blow up or burn the aircraft with alleged bombs or alleged flammable liquids. Since the initiation of these procedures, there have been 99 U.S. air carrier aircraft hijackings. This amounts to an average of about 8 hijackings per year. If the unusual waves of hijackings by homesick Cuban-refugees of 1980 and 1983 were normalized to the usual 1 to 3 a year of this type of hijacking experienced since 1979, the yearly average total hijackings would be 6 to 7 hijackings. The 3 hijackings attempted during this reporting period, including an incomplete hijacking to Cuba, represents the norm.

Passenger screening is carried out to detect and prevent the carriage aboard air carrier aircraft of firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, and other deadly weapons. The FAA's analysis of screening checkpoint activity includes the recording and study of the number of items detected and the false threats received, as well as related information concerning individuals arrested. Results of U.S. screening activities for the first 6 months of 1985 are detailed as follows:

During the first half of 1985, over 481.1 million passengers were processed through screening checkpoints at 392 airports. A total of 1,448 firearms were detected during this reporting period which is approximately 14 percent higher than the average of 1,269 weapons detected during the preceding 10 reporting periods. Ninety-five percent or 1,394 of the 1,448 weapons detected were discovered through X-ray inspection of carry-on items, 33 (3%) were detected by use of the metal detector and 21 (2%) were detected as the result of physical search. In addition, there were 5 explosive/incendiary devices detected during this period, i.e., 4 detected by X-ray inspection and 1 by physical search.

During this reporting period, 602 persons were arrested at screening points for carrying firearms/explosive devices. This represents a 16 percent decrease from the 720 arrests which occurred during the second half of 1984 but only a 1 percent decrease over the average of 610 arrests for all reporting periods during the preceding 5 years.

The 602 arrests were made at 88 airports of various sizes throughout the United States. Airports are categorized, in regard to screening activities, according to the number of persons screened per year.

Categories I, II, III, and IV are defined as follows: Category I - 2 million or more passengers screened; Category II - 500,000 - 2 million; and Categories III and IV - under 500,000. Eighty-two percent (497) of the 602 arrests occurred at the Category I airports (e.g., Houston, Texas; and San Francisco, California); 77 (13%) occurred at 25 Category II airports (e.g., Hartford, Connecticut; and Grand Rapids, Michigan); and 28 (5%) occurred at 17 Categories III and IV airports (e.g., Roanoke, Virginia; and Augusta, Georgia). In addition to criminal action taken by Federal and local jurisdictions, individuals who without proper authorization attempt to carry firearms or explosives/incendiary devices through screening checkpoints also may be subject to civil penalties imposed by the FAA.

Screening checkpoint equipment consists primarily of walk-through weapon detectors and, at high volume screening checkpoints, X-ray inspection systems for carry-on articles. At most stations, hand-held metal detection devices are used as backup support for the walk-through weapon detection devices. The FAA, in conjunction with the airline industry, has ongoing research and developmental projects geared toward producing new screening equipment which will improve capabilities to detect weapons and explosives, and minimize passenger inconvenience.

(See Exhibit 7)

VI. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Civil Aviation Security regulations and security programs must be effectively implemented. The FAA is responsible for ensuring compliance by airlines, airports, and individuals with the various security requirements imposed by pertinent regulations. The basic purpose of these requirements is to assure safety and security for airline passengers and crewmembers. Alleged or apparent violations of regulatory requirements are investigated and appropriate administrative or legal actions taken.

Success in achieving compliance by all concerned is primarily dependent upon the degree of cooperation between industry personnel and the persons responsible for enforcement of the regulations. Air carriers and airport operators generally take prompt corrective action on their own when a potential problem is recognized, thus reducing the need for more extensive enforcement action. In instances where an investigation of an alleged violation of the regulations indicates lack of compliance, administrative or legal action may be necessary. These actions take the form of warnings, letters of correction, or assessment of civil penalties.

During the first half of 1985, 1,791 investigations of alleged security violations by air carriers, foreign air carriers, airports, and individuals were completed. In 150 of the cases, civil penalties totaling \$51,795 were collected, and in 1,514 cases, administrative corrective action was taken. In the remaining 127 cases, investigation failed to

substantiate the alleged violations. The total number of investigations closed during the first half of 1985 represents a 4 percent increase over the number of investigations closed (1,719) during the second half of 1984.

(See Exhibit 8)

VII. OUTLOOK


A recent surge of deadly terrorist incidents was climaxed by the June 14 hijacking of a U.S. air carrier aircraft wherein one person was murdered and 39 were held hostage for over 2 weeks. As a result of these incidents, there has been a renewal of international pressure led by the U.S. to ensure the adequacy of security at all international airports worldwide. In addition, there has been renewed emphasis placed on the security procedures, security training, and security posture of U.S. air carrier and airport operations as well as on the assistance rendered to them by the FAA and law enforcement agencies, both Federal and local.

This increased national and international attention is expected to result in a substantial improvement in the effectiveness of civil aviation security measures throughout the world. In spite of preventative measures taken, however, it is believed that civil aviation, because of its nature and visibility as a vulnerable and highly dramatic activity, will remain a tempting and very desirable target for the mentally disturbed, criminal, and terrorist elements. Currently, there is, however, an effective civil aviation security system in place and, with the planned increased emphasis cited above, the primary purpose of the system—the reliable, efficient, safe and secure flow of people and protection of property—will be accomplished.



Federal Aviation Administration

Hijacking Attempts on U.S. Scheduled Air Carrier Aircraft¹/



½Effective September 1981-Includes All Certificate Holders as Defined in Code of Federal Regulations Title 14 Part 198.
½Hijacking in Which Hijacker Is Apprehended/Killed During Hijacking or a Result of "Hot Pursuit".

U.S. Aircarrier Hijacking Attempts Since Jan. 1, 1985

			Hijacker's
Airline-Rt/	Number	Hijacker's Boarding	Destination/
Aircraft	Aboard	Point	Objective
PA-558/	lZ .	Cleveland, OH	Brazil
B-727			
EA-403/	132	Newark, NJ	Cuta
A-300			
/t/841/	151	Athens, Greece	Prisoner
121.8			Release
	Airfine-Rt Aircraft PA-568/ B-727 EA-403/ A-300 TW-847/ B-727		Number 1 Aboard 27 27 132 132

EXHIBIT



Hijacking Attempts on U.S. And Foreign Aircraft*

Æ, 92 5 8 1976 8 1975 2 ĸ 2 1974 × 2 12 ମ Ø 8 ຣ 8 등 1971 ≈ 8 **\$** 28 1970 给 떮 器 13 8 # ÷ # 1981 1982 1988 B, 6 * 8 Federal Aviation Administration YEARLY HUNCKING ATTEMPTS U.S. % OF TOTAL HLIACKING BY CALENDAR YEAR FOREIGN 10TA C.S.

*Includes General Aviation Aircraft

EXHIBIT 2



Federal Aviation Administration

Hijacking Attempts on U.S. General Aviation Aircraft


TOTALS 27(61%) 585 擊 8 <u>8</u> 8 1979 240%) 240% 1(20%) 1978 S 1977 1976 2(33%) 4(87%) 1975 3(75%) 125% 1974 1(100%) 1973 1972 1971 150% (90%) 1970 9(100%) Pio 1983 o, YEARLY HUACKING ATTEMPTS $n_{complete}^{1}$ Insuccessful Successful TOTAL ਨ

¹ Hijacking in Which Hijacker is Apprehended/Killed During Hijacking or as a Result of "Hot Pursuit."

EXHIBIT 3



Actual Hijackings & Prevented Hijacking Attempts — 1974 to Present (U.S. Air Carrier Aircraft)



As of: 7/1/85

PREVENTED ATTEMPTS: Incidents in which it appeared the

individuals involved intended to hijack an aircraft but were prevented from doing so by socurity procedures.

EXHIBIT 4



Civil Aviation Security Basic Policies

of Transportation Rederat Autotion Administration

PROGRAM ELEMENT RESPONSIBILITY

SECURE TRAVEL

AIR CARRIERS

ACTIONS

MAINTAIN RESPONSIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS

SCREEN PASSENGERS, CARRY-ON ITEMS

SECURE BAGGAGE, CARGO PROCEDURES

PROTECT AIRCRAFT

MAINTAIN RESPONSIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS SECURE OPERATING

PROTECT AIR OPERATIONS AREA

ENVIRONMENT

AIRPORTS

PROVIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT

IDENTIFY AND ANALYZE THREAT

LEADERSHIP

₹

PRESCRIBE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

COORDINATE SECURITY OPERATIONS

PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

ENFORCE REGULATIONS

PROGRAM COSTS • SECURITY FU

PRUGKAM

 SECURITY FUNDED AS OPERATING COST OF SYSTEM

EXHIBIT 5



Federal Aviation Administration

Civil Aviation Security Scope and Effectiveness 1973-1985

- Over 6 Billion Persons Screened
- Almost 8 Billion Pieces of Carry-on Items Inspected
- Over 33,000 Firearms Detected
- Almost 14,000 Related Arrests
- Prevented by Airline and Airport Security Measures 113 Hijackings or Related Crimes May Have Been

EXHIBIT 6

Reza, Inc. -7767-(1) -DOT, Disk No. H1, un76/57, (size 18/9), 3/21/85, ghk ...



Airline Passenger Screening Results Civil Aviation Security

January 1980-June 1985

Federal Aviation Administration US Department of Transportation

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Persons Screened (Millions)	7487	E	÷	<u>.</u>	C 200	3HE		ğ	*/ R	3	.
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(2) Long Gurs	1	£	1	33	£	¥	Z	ð	ಣ	2	男
G) Other	\$	22	\$	83	IJ	×	8	\$	Ø	8	ĸ
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Persons Arrested											
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Explosives	ន	2	ă	3	2		8	3	E	Z	2
For Giving False Information	=	77	3	稏	7	(D	_	12	©	77	4

Source: Reports of Passenger Screening Activities at U.S. Airports

EXHIBIT 7

Federal Aviation Administration

Civil Aviation Security Compliance and Enforcement Actions

COM PROCESS PROCESS

	1973 through							·	į			
S. AIR CARRIERS	1978	1979	1980	1981	2862		꾫	- (3	,	<u>8</u>	
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Non Enforcement Actions	6	\$	路	89	\$		B					
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Investigations Pending	109	8	112	115	.		蒾		88	•	82	
OREIGN AIR CARRIERS												
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Non Enforcement Actions	9	က	5	-	7		7				0	
Civil Penalties (Amount)	0	0	0	2 (\$25,000)	0	•	۵	ı	<u>∞</u> ~	(\$6,000)	0	
Investinations Closed	4	ឧ	ន		9		ø		=		-	
Investigations Pending	*	15	ro.	2	4		4		_		-	
IRPORTS												
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1 others of Correction	311	8	5	14	71		පා		*		9	
Man Enforcement Actions	8	12	ន	61	6		æ		9		9	
Civil Penalties (Amount)	73 (\$43,600)	19 (\$15,150)	13 (\$15,600)	23 (\$21,675)		(96,300)	8	(\$7,250)		(\$6,750)	ر س	(\$2,900)
Investinations Closed	1,14		210	119	97		26		8		8	
Investigations Pending	23	32	\$	£3	≊		*		12		E	
NDIVIDUALS												
Administrative Corrections	111	617	1,469	2,168	2,267		,474	_	菱	•	 55	
Non Enforcement Actions	£	81	162	506								
Civil Penalties (Amount)	15 (\$4,350)	70 (\$11,300)	155 (\$27,210)	231 (\$49,410)		(\$28,085)		(\$84,130)		(\$24,074)	ਲ -	(\$38,245)
Investigations Closed	112	774	1,786	2,608	2,542	••	2,951	7	2,388		<u> </u>	
Investigations Pending	33	382	475	388	2 83				8		25	

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